George Rebane

President Trump’s recent proposal for the US to reacquire control of the Panama Canal has created a lot of controversy – most on the Left oppose such a reacquisition of control as more American imperialism, and most on the Right support it on national security grounds.  Facts about the status and operation of the canal are hard to get.  A contribution to inform the debate was submitted in the 27dec24 letter to Brian Kilmeade by Panama’s former ambassador to the US, Juan B. Sosa (here).

Ambassador Sosa submits a reasonable story that nevertheless overlooks or misunderstands some important factors about the canal’s ownership and administration of the strategic waterway.

1. Sosa asserts that “I can unequivocally say that China does not have control, or even influence on the operations of the Panama Canal.” The Hong Kong based company Hutchison Whampoa administers the canal’s terminal ports of Cristobal and Balboa.  What Sosa misses is that Hong Kong is now part of mainland China, and must respond to the dictates of its CCP no matter what its de juris relationship is to the communists.
2. “The claim that United States’ ships are being ripped off in fees for transiting the Canal is unfounded and far from the truth.” Tariffs and fees are assessed according to a “Neutrality Treaty introduced by the US” which supposedly “obligates the Panama Canal to treat all countries fairly and with the same tariffs”,   However, no one has publicized at what levels these assessments were initially made and how they now stack up as other countries have become more developed and wealthy in the interval.  The economic impact of canal tariffs and fees on the American economy is apparently minimal.
3. Income from the canal is the “lifeline of the economy of Panama”, and the basis for its opposition to relinquishing any part of it. Panama has also widened the alternative channel’s width to 180 feet (from the original channel’s 110 feet) which now permits America’s largest naval vessel’s use of the canal to again use the tactical shortcut in our preparation for a potential conflict with Red China.  It is the absolute control of this resource, most effectively secured by our military presence, that is of strategically paramount importance to the US. 
4. “The threat to ‘take the Canal back’ fails to recognize the history of the treaties’ debate when U.S. military experts widely accepted that the canal, with fifty miles of length and five (on) each side of the canal, is indefensible unless in friendly territory, which would not be the case under a major power imposing its might on Panama, the Canal and its people.” This is a thinly veiled threat that Panamanian insurgents will oppose any retaking of the canal by force and thereby make it an unusable waterway in a contested war zone.

Sosa concludes with a heartfelt call to not tamper with decades of a successful relationship between the two countries, stating “Panama has always treasured its relationship with United States since it declared its separation from Colombia in November 3, 1903 and was supported militarily by the United States which sealed Panama’s separation followed by the signing of the Canal Treaty. Since the new Treaty was signed in 1977 and began its transition period in 1980.”

Given such a history of good relations between our countries, it seems to me that the whole matter can be resolved with a newly negotiated treaty that re-examines and resets any material inequities in tariffs and fees, and more importantly allows the US to re-establish two or three military bases in what used to be known as the Canal Zone.  These bases would operate under a new status of forces agreement, and initiate another source of income for Panama in providing the support logistics and personnel for base facilities.  This should be much cheaper for the US and eminently more agreeable to the Panamanians.  We don’t have to retake the Canal Zone.